

## Colloque de Cerisy: an excellent opportunity

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The participation in Colloque de Cerisy "Anthropologie Historique de la Raison Scientifique" represented, for me and for the direction of my doctorate research an excellent opportunity of learning and change of information and experiences. Starting from this exchange it was possible to develop topics until then incipient and to bring new subjects that have been turned central in the plot of my thesis.

Among the themes approached during the colloquy, I emphasize here, for direct reasons that concern the direction of my work the discussions around the non modernity and of the *collectives* brought by Bruno Latour; the context of the different systems of nature's objectivation approached by Philippe Descola; the beautiful ethnographic study in laboratory undertaken by Sophie Houdart; the considerations about the continuity of the anthropomorphic reference marked by Lorraine Daston; besides Chris Herzfeld's, Vinciane Despret and Lucienne Strivay exhibitions concerning the statute of the relationships between humans and animals non-humans.

Starting from these contributions and making reference to the exposed works during the colloquy I intend to place here some points that concern to my research on the intersubjective relationships between primatologists and primates in the context of the anthropology of science and, more specifically, of the anthropology of the collectives.

But in what consist the intersubjective relationships? It is necessary to explain that for intersubjective relationships I consider just those that some experiential change is configured among the subjects, resulting in some effective earnings or some real transformation in both involved terms, and inexistent in the time that preceded it. With that, I intend to distinguish indeed in my analysis the category *intersubjectivity* from that denominated *projection*.

The *projections* as is usually designated all and any human overlay in non-humans also assumes an external tone accusatory: the relationships between primatologists and primates would be polluted for an anthropomorphic speech (when no anthropocentric). However, I consider important to emphasize, that I don't deny that happen human projections on the non-humans in some events, I just discard them to focus the subject of *intersubjectivity* priorly.

But how is it possible to differ intersubjective relationships of those called projectional? I believe that the first marker is in noticing the intersubjective relationships as resultants of the action and constituent of two or more subjects. With this, we stood back of the relationship notion where a subject is projected on an object. The critics could allege that, when projecting on a certain object, the subject makes nothing else that subjective it. The against-argument takes us to the second differential item between intersubjectivity and projection: interaction and passivity. If, on one side, to project something in somebody or some thing presupposes an action of the subject on a static object, on the other hand, we understood for intersubjectivity a mutual flow of changes and transformations in the terms that compose the relationship. That make us to believe that as much the primatologists are put upon the primates as the primates do it to the primatologists, simultaneous and intensely.

But will it be possible to think the intersubjectivity inside of a modern ontology? Will it be possible to place it inside of a cosmology that incites the maintenance of the verb *to observe* as an outline limit? It is here that I think interesting to operate an analytical rupture elevating the action of *relating* as a verb of action of these intersubjective manifestations, besides adopting the idea of *collectives* (Latour) as an alternative to all fragmentation that separates subject from objects, or human societies from animal societies. But, if we do not separate humans from non-humans, the statements of metonymical character tend not to sustain here. Inside of collective, monkeys are not part of a whole *human society* (here we would include the *scientific society*), and not even the humans would be part of a whole *animal nature*.

I think that the relationships between primatologists and primates for me studied are affirmed in speech through oppositions. The collective in subject is permeated by antithetic relationships: cultural genetics and genetic culture, primate object and subject primate, researcher's genealogy and primate's genealogy, technique and experience, etc. However, the antithesis should not be understood as mere antagonistic maintenance among the terms, but as reinforcement to the analogical idea among them: it is affirmed the relationship and the speech is confirmed by the associations among humans and non-humans. This way, to talk about intersubjectivity no longer exercises any reference to the projection of a term on the other, but to the propositional statement of the resulting relationship from the denial among them: antithetic collectives.

Focusing the relationship between humans and non-humans, we arrived to their intersubjective narratives that announce the primate's participation in the histories of life of their primatologists and of the primatologists composing the histories of their primate's life. These narratives are histories lived and counted during the primatologist's field work. They constitute a type of unofficial speech, hidden since it is still believed that its spread could commit the ruled scientific credibility in presupposed objectives. There would not be space for subjectivities in publications in qualified scientific newspapers, where reigns graphs, tables, numbers and acronyms. This type of reports from field experiences is common among the primatologists that are devoted to register them as memories. Therefore, when they cross the limits of the closed forests, these histories find backrest only in a locus where the subjectivity is confused with exoticism, and sometimes eccentricity: a literary gender many times depreciated by the own scientists and characterized as para-scientific.

It is not without reason that the own authors protect themselves from the critics through strategies that confuse their *experience* reports with *experimental* narratives. To experiment assumes, therefore, the double sense of indeed to commit with their inhuman object-subjects and to exonerate of being object of inhuman critics.

The first contacts narratives between primatologists and primates express a significant moment of intersubjectivity during the field work. For a scientist to "be accepted by the non-human's group" implicates in submitting to some existent nuances in this relationship as, for instance, the suppression of the desire from interacting in function of the scientific context which this relationship is develop, the empathy feeling for the other, or still to submit to the risks of the cultural representation of its own nature idea on the nature of the other.

In the scenery of scientific production there is always a reflexive compensation regarding the human subject's participation. The forms of thinking the interaction tend to be treated in the same objective way that intends to treat the objects. Usually, to turn intelligible the mutual perception, the participation, the intervention and the experience in these relationships mean culturize them in a way in that the human action is always projected on a passive object. This way the antithesis rejuvenates as we verify that inside of this naturalistic

system is presupposed by humans the imposed action of its monolithic culture on the non-humans. To act with scientific objectivity would be to recognize the own human cultural nature and to isolate it in order to preserve the non-human nature to be translated through the scientific production. The scientific training becomes working as a modern inhibitor of the intersubjective relationships, where the nature and culture notions are not antagonistic, but they are in a game.

In this way, there is a latent tension in these events in that the scientific objectivity is shown unable to mediate the encounter between primatologist and primate. Since the exhibition to the escape risk of neutrality induces the reflection about the empiric conditions of the field work, constituting true rites of passage.

Nevertheless, conventionally cases of interaction between primatologist and primate are seen as a mere gesture of human intervention in the non-human's life. But how would be possible to admit that these demands for relationship would come from inert objects?

Although they don't supply us "a form of thinking about the world as a whole", as it was proposed formerly by the simplified biological theories, the primates non-humans can be revealing of the researcher's group that study them (Haraway). Naming or personifying the primates, noticing its gestures as their own, habituating and pacifying them, and even being involved emotionally with them, the primatologists leave traces in their reports that show that these relationships are never unilateral. The reciprocity among the two involved subjects is that bases their approach. This means to say that, in the intersubjective narratives the focus is not in the mutual projections, but essentially in the descriptions on the ways of noticing the encounter among two beings in continuous worlds (Ingold). This is why that "to be accepted by the studied primate's group" is necessary before to accept that this proposition is valid.

To accept the conditions imposed to the scientific work by the relationship between humans and non-humans is not a simple task for most of the primatologists. The risk of incurring in interpretations that confuse anthropomorfism with the anthropocentrism (Daston) accompanies the primatologists work. However, the way as this anthropomorfization feels can be decisive in the direction of the field research. The logic in seeing the humanity as condition common to humans and primates is present, as we will see, in most of these intersubjective narratives. By this way we approximated this analysis of the "personal relationships" between humans and non-humans to the models described in the perspective systems of the Amazonian indigenous, because also "Here, it is necessary to know to personify, because it is necessary to personify to know". (Viveiros de Castro). If "Knowing is to personify, to take the point of view of what should be known" (Viveiros de Castro), we should not find strange the symmetries between scientists and Amerindian when they say that animals are people: people capable of intentionality conscious and acting.

Authors as Barbara Smuts proposes a new synthesis, totally different from that made known by the social and biological thought (which the intersection between humans and non-humans would be made under the sign of biology, in other words, of Nature). Intersubjectivity it is understood as a new meeting of collective, humans and non-humans, beginning from the process of cultural transformation that they are subject, in the relationships that are established among them. To involve, to entangle, to relate are the key-words here.

The intersubjectivity is different, therefore, from what we called projection for not referring the simple anthropomorfization of the monkey or the human's zoomorfization, but for being a speech in a dialogical construction. However, it doesn't also constitute evidence of a denial to the own naturalistic ontology in that it is confined. The intersubjectivity appears as a short circuit that, before invalidating the whole system, it attests its existence through fugacious psychic manifestations, ruptures and reflexivity.

Another form of exposing this deutero learning (Bateson) in the relationships among researcher and the object of the research is to think that the intersubjective experience represents the transposition of a human world to an animal world through the subject's perception readaptation. As it is not enough to observe, there are situations that the demand is to relate. And, in front of this new demand, the scientific posture of estrangement between subject and object seemed not more to overcome on this reality. To do "good science" appears now associated to the researcher's disposition in learning with his/her subject-object everything that his/her previous years of training had not supplied him/her. The condition now is the researcher's capacity of being camouflaged to the intersubjective context and just not to hide in the forest waiting not to be noticed by his/her speakers non-humans. Between the human's world and the non-human's world the primatologist lives the difference in his/her own body and in his/her own sensitive abilities, and it makes that incorporating (Csordas) experiences that originally did not belong to him/her.

The undeniable perceptive dimension between humans and animals non-humans, as it was emphasized by Vinciane Despret, it is opposed sharply to the idea that the last ones are put as mere receptacles of the action from the first ones. A present idea in reflections as "They [primates] were studying me as carefully as I [primatologist] was studying them" (Strier). But how to understand of this mutual perception except starting from the agents involved in this relationship? If the primatologists are legitimated as mediators among these two worlds – the one of the humans and the one of the non-humans – I consider being important to study their speech, their narratives.

Now, if on one side we placed the perception of two worlds, two bodies, two natures, on the other side we are talking about only one culture. A culture *of* relationship and *in* relationship. In this narrative and intersubjective culture it is located the possibility of a dialogue/agreement between humans and non-humans, what turns viable to speak in terms of interspecific knowledge. In this culture shared by the collective it is possible to distinguish multi naturally bodies, types, categories, etc. That happens according to unstable and incidental parameters, because the distinctions are not perennial. They are flowing as the cultural relationships in that it they are inserted.

Leaving from an articulation idea among the studies dedicated to the indigenous and western cosmologies I intend to think the anthropological theory also in relationship: an approach between the indigenous ethnologists and the science ones as attempt of breaking with the modern tradition of separation among *us* (anthropologists) and *them* (native).

Just like the exercise done by Sophie Houdart comparing scientists and xamãs, it is not thinking *one in function of the other*, but to relate them *one in reason of the other*. If "the functional equivalent of the indigenous xamanism is the science" and "the rattle of xamã is our accelerator of particles" (Viveiros de Castro) how could we transpose this relationship to our ethnographies? In this research between primatologists and primates, I try to approximate some relative reflections to the Amerindian perspective as na instrument to think western cosmologies. It is not to establish simple analogies between the Amerindian thought and the scientific thought, but leaving from homologies as the idea that the animals "see as the humans", but it not always see us as humans (Viveiros de Castro) and to test its effectiveness as a tool to discuss subjects as the animal perception and the sociomorfism in the science.

It is evident that are limitations in this analytical proposal. One of them concerns the impossibility of affirming that the own primates non-humans distinguish culture from nature.

An alternative would be to think the relationship between humans and non-humans including them in only one collective. In this case, culture would not just mean human tradition, but the own intersubjective discursive. Culture for that primatologists and primates collective is the own relationship that allows them to classify things *naturally*.

Another difficulty in sustaining this type of perspective guided to a western context is to determine what is the point of view of an animal non-human. This is a central problem since we are placed in a different ontology from that in which classic ethnographies were accomplished about the Amerindian perspective, to overcome this it would be necessary to think as making possible an perspective approach inside of a naturalistic ontology besides bringing in a multinaturalist hypothesis inside a multicultural system.

When distinguishing four great manners of “nature’s objectivation” (the totemism, the animism, the analogism and the naturalism), Philippe Descola indicates that even being preponderant in certain spaces and times these manners should not be thought as hegemonian ones. Each one tolerates the discreet existence of the other ones three since these manifestations don’t question the central function in the preponderant way. Descola also observes that, with the constant traffic of ideas, people and values, it is possible that this panorama is altered in a preponderant way to a mixture in more balanced proportions. In this sense that I focus my analysis between the classic model animist and the naturalistic pattern. Without conceiving them as tight and separate forms, I look at the shortcuts that articulate them.

I don't have the intention of placing the primatologists as a group of animists outside of the naturalistic ontology, and not even affirm that some of them are. My challenge is to think that in certain circumstances, under certain point of view, and in some situations the relationship between primatologists and primates animical way is configured. It is, in agreement with my understanding, a type of animist short circuit inside of a wider system of naturalistic logic. Thus, the existence of multiple natures in a naturalistic regime could be existed if us, anthropologists, choose also to mediate the no-western cosmologies and the scientific ones, putting our own theory in perspective.